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Newe Sogobie:  Treaty breach, Trust 
status and extinguished land title 
 
Zia Ahktar 
       
 
Introduction  
 
The Native Americans’ core issue with the United States (US) 
government is that there was no derogation of title in the aftermath of 
signing their treaties. This created reservations and imposed terms which 
they could not refuse for fear of dispossession in the face of unchecked 
migration in the mid nineteenth century. It was in the period when the US 
was settling its frontier with migrants under the banner of Manifest 
Destiny.
128
  By the mechanism of the Treaty of Ruby Valley (“RV”) 1863, 
the Western Shoeshone were corralled onto a portion of Nevada that 
                                                
128 19th century expression of the belief that ‘White Americans had a God given right to colonise the whole of 
the north American continent’.  http://www.historyonthenet.com/American_West/manifest_destiny.htm. 
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became their reservation. There was then a sale of additional estate that is 
claimed to have not met the legal standards of a transaction with a 
fiduciary. This is the subject of ongoing litigation on the basis that the US 
is in breach of Treaty, trustee rights and its due process clause in the Bill 
of Rights.    
In terms of their original incorporation, the territories where the 
Indians resided when the colonial project was launched were defined as 
terra nullius. The discovery of the continent presupposed that the land was 
inhabited by barbarians who had no legal right to the land. At the inception 
of the US this idea was conventional wisdom as the 13 colonies became 
the first government of the Federal United States in 1783. In his essay, ''An 
Overview of Indian Populations,'' 
129
 C Mathew Snipp sets out to translate 
the term, ''empty land,'' as an assertion of a right to entitlement of real 
estate inhabited by indigenous peoples:  
 
As Europeans came to understand that the land being taken was 
inhabited by indigenous people, the doctrine evolved.  This 
notion of terra nullius and the idea of uncultivated land became 
very important ... for opening the lands in the West for 
                                                
129 "An Overview of Indian Populations," chapter in  "American Indian Nations" (2007, Alta 
Mira Press), 
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settlement, because if land is not cultivated by the Indians, it 
must be there for the taking. This became a primary justification 
for westward expansion, and continues to be such to this day.  
 
He observes further that: 
 
indigenous peoples continue to experience modern 
interpretations of this doctrine in relation to waters and territories 
that, because of their rich resources, are deemed more valuable to 
the United States than to Indians . It is the invented legacy of 
Columbus that America cherishes. 
130
 
 
The US government’s guardianship over its indigenous peoples is based 
upon a notion of a fiduciary obligation not found in ordinary trust 
principles. Its scope has been raised before a UN Advisory body by the 
native nations in their challenge that the US had no residual powers over 
them.   
                                                
130
 Ibid .  
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In Hopi Nation v US131 a submission to the United Nations 
Secretariat by the Hopi Nation in 1987 stated that there was no grant of 
"trustee" powers that allowed the US to exercise control over that tribe. 
The US argued that there was: 
 
… a unique political relationship between the Hopi tribe and the 
United States... Confirmation and acceptance of that special 
relationship by Indian tribes automatically subject them to the 
authority of Congress and the United States. 
 
The Federal government pleaded that it acknowledged the international 
principles of “self-government and free consent”.
132
 It is a position that 
simply means that it permits the sovereignty of the Indian nations, but in 
practice it falls short of real sovereignty and its premises is the terra 
nullius principle, which provides it with the legal authority to treat the land 
as it pleases including designating reservations for the native peoples.  
                                                
131 Response of the Government of the United States to United Nations Secretariat Notes no. G/SO 215/1 USA 
(107), (112), (114), (117), and (119). United Nations Economic and Social Council, E/CN.4/GR.1987/7/Add.12 
(30 September 1987), 23. 
132 However the US submission to the UN also specifies that it does not have a "trust" relationship 
with the original Hopi government because that government has never confirmed and accepted such a 
relationship. http://www.nativeweb.org/pages/legal/shoeshone/dismiss_opp.html 

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This article will elaborate that the Federal government has 
mistreated the Native Americans by breaching their Treaty rights, the 5
th
 
Amendment of the US Constitution’s Bill of Rights by taking land without 
justification, and by the licencing of the corporations who trespass on 
indigenous reservations by their mining. This paper will show that the 
issue of the title to land is unsettled despite the Indian Land Tribunal 
rulings. It is possible to raise it by reference to judicial review proceedings 
that will take account of the infringement of trustee principles and 
international legal standards that have not been respected by the US.    
 
Original theory of territorial conquest 
 
The Federal government arrived at its role as the primary guarantor 
of the native people by the process of the US Constitution. Its modus 
operandi with the Indians was achieved by the incorporation of the 
Commerce clause in Article I, Section 8, Clause 3, which states: “The 
Congress shall have power . . . To regulate commerce with foreign nations, 
and among the several states, and with the Indian tribes …”. 
The use of this provision by Congress with regard to Native 
Americans has been the subject of long, intense political and legal 
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controversy, because it has defined the distribution of powers between the 
Federal government and the states. The grant of a legislative or plenary 
power of Congress to decide the affairs of Indian tribes was supplemented 
by the courts over the Indians to form a judicial doctrine of authority over 
indigenous people. This was achieved by the conflict over the issue of the 
superior title to land that has been decided by the Supreme Court.    
In Johnson v McIntosh133 there was a dispute of title between a 
government purchase of land and the defendant who was asserting the 
perpetuity of tribal title in real estate.  Chief Justice Marshall ruled that 
“the discovery process gave title to the (US) Government by whose 
subject, or by whose authority, it was made, against all other European 
governments”.  The Chief Justice cited various charters to document  
Britain’s  acceptance of the discovery  doctrine, and how America had 
inherited its mantle, as far as ownership was concerned granting the 
Indians a mere title of occupation.  
He stated of England’s colonial enterprise as follows:  
 
                                                
133 1 Wheatley 542 ( 1823) .   

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 So early as 1496, her monarch granted a commission to the 
Cabots, to discover countries then unknown to Christian people, 
and to take possession of them in the name of the King of 
England.  
 
Justice Marshall held  that the Christian European nations making such 
discoveries only had an obligation to recognise the “prior  title  of any 
Christian  people  who may have made  a previous discovery” making the 
assumption that the native title, as that may exist, was null and void . The 
judgment established the Marshall doctrine that was consolidated in two 
other cases decided by the Court under the same Chief Justice.  
In Cherokee Nation v The State of Georgia,134 the Cherokees were 
seeking an injunction against being absorbed by the State of Georgia and 
they invoked the Court’s jurisdiction over suits between states and foreign 
governments on the grounds that the Cherokee Nation was a foreign 
government.  The Supreme Court held that the Indian tribes were 
“denominated domestic dependent nations” and that Congress had 
jurisdictional authority over them. They existed only as a “distinct   
                                                
13430 US 1  (1831) 
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society, but not as a political entity”.  Their relation to the US was as “that 
of a ward to his guardian” and not that of full-fledged states. 
 
The Court ruled: 
 
Though the Indians are acknowledged to have an unquestionable, 
and, heretofore, unquestioned right to the lands they occupy, 
until that right shall be extinguished by a voluntary cession to our 
government; yet it may well be doubted whether those tribes 
which reside within the acknowledged boundaries of the United 
States can, with strict accuracy, be denominated foreign nations. 
They may, more correctly be denominated domestic dependent 
nations. They occupy a territory to which we assert a title 
independent of their will, which must take effect in point of 
possession when their right of possession ceases. Meanwhile, 
they are in a state of pupilage. Their relation to the United States 
resembles that of a ward to his guardian. 
 
C J Marshall’s characterisation of the tribes as "dependent nations" is the 
basis for what has been called the trust relationship between the US and 
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the Indian tribes, through which the Federal government protects the tribes 
from interference and intrusion by state governments and state citizens. 
The collective effect of these cases on the development of federal Indian 
law has been described as the three bedrock principles by Philip J. 
Prygoski,  a professor of law of Constitutional and federal Indian law at 
the Thomas M. Cooley Law School in Lansing, Michigan. He states that 
these have cemented a theory as follows: 
135
  
 
(1) by virtue of aboriginal political and territorial status, Indian 
tribes possessed certain incidents of preexisting sovereignty;  
 
(2) such sovereignty was subject to diminution or elimination by 
the United States, but not by the individual states; and  
 
(3) the tribes' limited inherent sovereignty and their 
corresponding dependency on the United States for protection 
imposed on the latter a trust responsibility.  
 
Professor Prygoski states that:  
                                                
135From Marshall to Marshallhttp://www.abanet.org/genpractice/magazine/1995/fall/marshall.html 
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there are two competing theories of tribal sovereignty: first, the 
tribes have inherent powers of sovereignty that predate the 
"discovery" of America by Columbus; and second, the tribes 
have only those attributes of sovereignty that Congress gives 
them. The Supreme Court has relied on one or the other of these 
theories in deciding the sovereignty cases, but which ever theory 
the Court has favored in a given case it has determined to a large 
extent what powers the tribes have and what protections they 
receive against federal and state government encroachment.
136
 
 
Treaty of Ruby Valley      
  
The issues of contention between the indigenous people and the 
Federal government are the terms of treaties that have consigned them as 
nominally independent nations within the US. In asserting their 
sovereignty the Western Shoeshone have been in the forefront of litigation 
against the US government in recent times both in the US courts and 
internationally.  They claim the territory called Newe Sogobie, the ‘land of 
                                                
136 Ibid. 
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the People of the Earth’. 
137
This is a territory defined by the Treaty of 
Friendship and Peace or the Treaty of Ruby Valley between the US and 
the Western Shoeshone in 1863. The extent of the land the Treaty covered 
included most of the State of Nevada, and parts of California, Idaho, and 
Utah where the various bands of the tribe had traditionally roamed as 
nomadic and sedentary people.  
The Treaty subtext provided the US government rights to land that 
are set out in the following two provisions:  138 
    
ARTICLE 4 
 
It is further agreed by the parties hereto, that the Shoeshonee 
country may be explored and prospected for gold and silver, or 
other minerals; and when mines are discovered, they may be 
worked, and mining and agricultural settlements formed, and 
ranches established whenever they may be required. Mills may 
                                                
137 The Shoeshone are aborigines and their name means the snake people. They were split into the Idaho groups 
of Western Shoeshone were called Tukuaduka (sheep eaters), while the Nevada/Utah ones were called the 
Gosiute or Toi Ticutta (cattle eaters).  The estimated population of Northern and Western Shoeshone was 4,500 
in 1845. In a census,  after nearly a century there were  3,650 Northern Shoeshone and 1,201 Western 
Shoeshone, in a 1937 count by the United States Office of Indian Affairs. 

138 http://www.nativeweb.org/pages/legal/shoeshone/ruby_valley.html 
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be erected and timber taken for their use, as also for building and 
other purposes in any part of the country claimed by said bands. 
 
ARTICLE 6 
 
The said bands agree that whenever the President of the United 
States shall deem it expedient for them to abandon the roaming 
life, which, they now lead, and become herdsmen or 
agriculturalists, he is hereby authorized to make such 
reservations for their use as he may deem necessary within the 
country above described; and they do also hereby agree to 
remove their camps to such reservations as he may indicate, and 
to reside and remain therein. 
 
These stipulations were deemed to prevail even over those chiefs or 
headmen of the Western Shoeshone who were not parties to the Treaty.  
However, the seeds of the dispute between the US and the tribe flared up 
when the desire to expand its infrastructure caused the Federal government 
to buy additional land. This transaction was forced upon the tribes under 
the terms of the Treaty at the price of 2.50 cents an acre, which was a 
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gross undervalue at the time when it was negotiated. It was conducted at 
the period of the gold rush and the provisions of the Mining Act 1872 
made it mandatory on the tribe to sell the land.  
139
  
The US government in the purchase of land at an undervalue has 
been breaching the 5
th
 Amendment of the US constitution. This states quite 
clearly that “No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public 
use, without just compensation”. In this transaction that the Federal 
government completed with the Western Shoeshone, there is clear 
suspicion that it was without the due process being followed. It has led to 
the charge from the Native Americans that it was breached in undervalued 
purchase.    
The issue came to light when the Indian Reorganisation Act 1934 
was enacted which caused the institution of a structure modelled on the 
Federal government, unlike the tiers of traditional Chiefs that had 
governed the Western Shoeshone tribe. 
140
  The federal authorities 
sponsored a Ta Moak Council (“TMC”) to be the new government, but 
                                                
139 The General Mining Act of 1872, 30 U.S.C.  SS 21-54 states:  “the citizens can enter and use public lands for 
mining exploration. If valuable mineral deposits are found, a mining claim may be filed for a lode or placer 
claim, as well as a nearby mill-site”. 

140 The Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 assigned the U.S. as trustee of the reservation lands. As not all 
Indians lived on reservations, only a part of the Western Shoeshone came under the IRA governments. The rest 
formally joined the National Council. www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/41/018.html. 
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those who opposed this interference formed a National Council (“NC”) 
which aimed to represent those Western Shoeshones who wanted to claim 
their lands under the Ruby Valley Treaty. 
The NC reflected the concerns of the Dann band, a group of kinsmen 
who are part of this tribe and who live on the Duck Water Valley part of 
the reservation, earmarked by the RVT as the tribe’s. This new entity of 
the NC was not, however, recognised by the US government which 
encouraged the TMC to submit a claim to the Indian Claims Commission 
established in 1946, to adjudicate on Native American claims of 
dispossession.    
The NC objected to this application by the TMC by stating that such 
action was invalid because the US had never been able to extinguish 
Western Shoeshone title. It raised the point by arguing that the Treaty of 
RV was still effective and they were seeking not just compensation in 
monetary terms, but also full restitution in terms of land seized since the 
1863 reservation was established.  
In Western Shoeshone v US141 the Indian Claims Commission 
(“ICC”) upheld the claim that the Western Shoeshone had been deprived 
of their land by 'gradual encroachment' of whites and others but without a 
                                                
141 ICC 387 (1962).    
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specific 'taking' date. They applied the July 1872 transaction as the 
approximate date of valuation for the compensation claim. The 
Commission determined the fair market value of the lands acquired from 
the Western Shoeshone to be $21,550,000, and limited itself to awarding 
damages on that computation alone.  
After an appeal there was a further ruling in 1977 when the ICC 
entered final judgment, and awarded the Western Shoeshone (“WS”) more 
than $26 million in damages for “full extinguishment of aboriginal title”. 
The US Court of Claims in 1979 also gave its ruling that went against the 
wishes of the major portion of the Shoeshone, and awarded them less than 
$27 million of the 1872 value without interest, for the appropriation under 
Article 5 of the Bill of Rights. The Shoeshone refused to accept the money 
because it would have constituted for them surrendering all their rights to 
their ancestral homeland that they deemed was worth more on its 
appropriation.    
The WS rank and file rejected the damages. The monetary amount 
was received by the Secretary of the Interior. This has now been held in a 
trust account for more than 40 years and it has grown with interest to over 
$100 million. However, experts have opined that the ICC was flawed as an 
adjudicative body and had been established by the government to absolve 
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itself of the blame for land seizures in violation of treaties pledged from 
the late nineteenth century.  
At its original hearings there were 176 federally recognised Indian 
nations who filed at least one claim prior to 1951. This led to 370 petitions 
in which enrolled tribes claimed the Federal government had provided 
them either with inadequate or no compensation for land taken from them. 
Almost a third of the petitions focused on the government's 
mismanagement of natural resources or trust funds.  
 In his very damning analysis of the tribunal, Harvey D. Rosenthal 
states that the: 
 
… federal government itself tacitly admitted as much during the 
1970s in the findings of the so-called Indian Claims Commission, 
to make "quiet" title to all illegally taken Indian land within the 
lower 48 states. What the Commission did over the ensuing 
thirty-five years was in significant part to research the ostensible 
documentary basis for U.S. title to literally every square foot of 
its claimed territory. It found, among other things, that the United 
States had no legal basis whatsoever—no treaty, no agreement, 
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not even an arbitrary act of Congress—to fully one-third of the 
area within its boundaries.
142
 
 
The ICC had been originally mandated to decide claims for ten years, but 
such was the demand that its board operated until September 1978, when 
the US Court of Claims superseded jurisdiction over outstanding cases. 
While the ICC Commission outcome was deemed a final verdict to the 
outstanding claims of Indian tribes as regards the ownership of land, those 
tribes who considered it as part of the manipulative process have refused 
to accept its findings. 
143
  
 
Trespass actions against the Western Shoeshone 
 
The monetary settlement was not acceptable to the NC, including the 
Dann band, who wanted to resurrect their title which, they claimed, was 
illegally stolen from the Western Shoeshone. The courts have ruled in a 
series of cases that they are not to be deemed the legal owners of property 
                                                
142 Indian Claims and the American Conscience: A Brief History of the Indian Claims Commission, in 
Imre Sutton, ed., Irredeemable America: The Indians' Estate and Land (Albuquerque: University of 
New Mexico Press, 1985, pp. 35-86).  
143 This includes the Sioux whose claim, the Black hills, is the longest running case in the US history. 
They have refused to accept a monetary settlement in lieu of the return of Paha Sapi, their name for 
the range. 
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taken from the tribe and that their original land must be considered as 
public lands.  
In 1973, the Bureau of Land Management (“BLM”), part of the 
Department of the Interior, cited the Dann band for trespassing on BLM 
land. It alleged that by grazing livestock without an official permit on land 
considered to be “public” the Danns were violating the 1934 Grazing Act, 
intended for the management of public rangelands. This trespass issue was 
based on the presumption that the band members were using public 
property that lay at the core of their land rights dispute with the Federal 
government. In response to the grazing permit breach they argued that 
their Aboriginal title to the land prevented the US government from 
requiring them to hold the herbivore licences. 
This led to a trespass action by the US government in US v Dann.144 
Although successful at the District Court level the Federal government had 
the decision overturned at the Ninth Circuit Court. It reversed the first 
instance decision by stating that the Shoeshone title was not extinguished 
because the money had not been paid. The Appeal Court ruling in Nevada 
left open the possibility that, firstly, the land title may not have been 
extinguished and, secondly individual proprietors on their ranches could 
                                                
144 470 US 39 (1985). 
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assert their rights that they were not on public land. The government then 
petitioned the Supreme Court for a review,  but in their submission did not 
ask the Court to determine ownership, and only if payment had been made 
as per the Federal Claims Court ruling.  
At the Supreme Court it was ruled that the transfer of funds to the 
Secretary of the Interior constituted payment whether the Shoeshones 
accepted the funds or not. The Court ruled that the US government had 
priority based on the judgment of the ICC ruling that right to lands in 
Nevada had previously been “fully extinguished”  for the tribe including 
hunting and fishing rights. It added further that the Federal authorities had 
paid $ 26 million for this taking of Western Shoeshone property when it 
first purchased it in 1872.  
The Court upheld the original ICC ruling made under Section 22 (2) 
of its statute that their determination of title was final. It applied to Nevada 
as well as to the rest of the country; and the creation of a reserve in 1863 
could not prevent these outcomes as the land acquisition was deemed valid 
by its provisions.  
Justice Brennan, giving the majority ruling of the Court stated:  
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The Court has applied these principles to relations between 
Native American communities and the United States. In 
Seminole Nation v. United States,   316, US, 286 (1942, the 
United States was obligated by treaty to pay annual annuities to 
members of the Seminole Nation. Instead, the Government 
transferred the money to the Seminole General Council. 
Members of the Tribe argued that because the Seminole General 
Council had misappropriated the money, the Government had not 
satisfied its obligation to pay the individual members of the 
Tribe. In disposing of the case, the Court relied upon the rule that 
"a third party who pays money to a fiduciary for the benefit of 
the beneficiary, with knowledge that the fiduciary intends to 
misappropriate the money or otherwise be false to his trust, is a 
participant in the breach of trust and liable therefore to the 
beneficiary."  
 
The Court's holding was based on its recognition of the 
traditional rule that a debtor's payment to a fiduciary of the 
creditor satisfies the debt. Absent actual knowledge of the 
fraudulent intent of the trustee - or some other recognized 
102 
 
exception to the general rule - the Government's payment to the 
Council would have discharged its treaty obligations. Ibid. The 
order remanding the case for purposes of determining whether 
the Government had fraudulent intent, id., at 300, would have 
made sense only if the Court believed that, absent such 
knowledge, the Government's treaty obligations were discharged. 
 
The Court's reliance on the general rule in Seminole Nation is 
authority for our holding that the United States has made 
"payment" under 22(a). The final award of the Indian Claims 
Commission placed the Government in a dual role with respect to 
the Tribe: the Government was at once a judgment debtor, owing 
$26 million to the Tribe, and a trustee for the Tribe responsible 
for ensuring that the money was put to productive use and 
ultimately distributed in a manner consistent with the best 
interests of the Tribe. In short, the Indian Claims Commission 
ordered the Government qua judgment debtor to pay $26 million 
to the Government qua trustee for the Tribe as the beneficiary. 
Once the money was deposited into the trust account, payment 
was effected.  
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The Danns also claim to possess individual as well as tribal 
aboriginal rights and that because only the latter were before 
the Indian Claims Commission, the "final discharge" of 22 
(a) does not bar the Danns from raising individual aboriginal 
title as a defense in this action. Though we have recognized 
that individual aboriginal rights may exist in certain 
contexts, this contention has not been addressed by the 
lower courts and, if open, should first be addressed below. 
We express no opinion as to its merits. 
145
  
 
The Court ruled that the ICC certification of a monetary award occurred 
when the government placed the funds in the Western Shoeshone Treasury 
account on “a statutory interpretation” of the ICC Act, rather than on an 
actual finding of the “extinguishment of title”. However, Justice Brennan 
reasoned that, while the pleadings based on the Nevada Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals decision did not preclude a subsequent course of action, 
                                                
145 J Brennan delivered the opinion of the Court based on the question presented whether the appropriation of 
funds into a Treasury account pursuant to 31 U.S.C. § 724a (1976 ed., Supp. V)] constitutes "payment”   under 
22(a) of the Indian Claims Commission Act, 60 Stat. 1055, 25 U.S.C. 70u(a) (1976 ed.)  
http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/cgi-bin/getcase.pl?court=us&vol=470&invol=39. 

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because the relevant title issue was neither actually pleaded nor actually 
decided in the ICC proceedings, this did not end the possibility of further 
litigation.    
As a consequence of this anomaly the Dann band pressed their claim 
as a class action law suit to declare their land title in perpetuity and to 
allege discrimination on account of a breach of a 5
th
 Amendment right. 
This Article states that there has to be due process in the taking of land; it 
has to be for a valid public purpose; and adequate compensation paid for 
any taking of land.  The 14
th
 Amendment underlies its procedure to be 
contingent on a guarantee of equal rights and protection to an individual or 
a group of people under the US Constitution.  
  
Inter-American Court declares a wrongful taking    
 
After exhausting their remedy at the Supreme Court level in the US 
the Western Shoeshone decided to present a petition at the Organisation of 
American States (“OAS”) Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 
(“IA-CHR”) in 1994. The band was represented by Carrie and the late 
Mary Dann, who alleged that they have had use and occupation of their 
lands since ‘time immemorial’, and that the US purported to have 
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appropriated the land as Federal property through an ICC judgment 
procedure, which was not an appropriate tribunal for this to be heard 
because its terms and reference were set by the US government.  
The IA-CHR is a permanent body with headquarters in 
Washington, and it meets in regular and special sessions several times a 
year to examine allegations of human rights violations in the hemisphere. 
Its duties stem from the reference to three documents; the OAS Charter, 
the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man 1948 and the 
American Convention on Human Rights 1969. The Commission (i) acts on 
individual petitions alleging human rights violations, (ii) prepares studies 
and reports, and (iii) makes recommendations to OAS member states for 
the adoption of progressive measures in favour of human rights. 
Its two main functions are adjudicatory and advisory. Under the 
former, it hears and rules on the specific cases of human rights violations 
referred and rules on cases brought before it in which a state party to the 
Convention has accepted its contentious jurisdiction accused of a human 
rights violation. The Commission issues resolutions, reports and 
recommendations to States to ensure respect for the rights set out in the 
106 
 
Inter-American human rights instruments and those set out in its 
“Protection Mechanisms”.
146
 
The Commission has the power under its mandate to declare 
precautionary measures to prevent serious human rights violations in 
urgent cases, which, in some instances, mean references to the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights (“IAC”). The IAC was established in 
1979 and has adjudicatory powers that include advisory opinions on 
matters relating to the interpretation of the American Convention. The US 
however is one of the 13 countries out of 35 that do not recognise the 
jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court, because of its non-ratification of 
the American Convention of Human Rights. 
147
  
The petition to the OAS HR Commission set out the alleged 
impropriety of the US government and its breach of the OAS Charter for 
Human Rights.  The issue of trespass was framed with the Western 
Shoeshone assertion that the US had physically removed livestock and 
other property from their land. The Danns claimed that this was to 
                                                
146 The Inter-American Commission of Human Rights (IACHR) is established under Article 33 of the American 
Convention on Human Rights, 9 I.L.M. 673 (1970). 
147 The Court's jurisdiction is limited. It may only hear cases where the state involved has a). ratified the 
American Convention on Human Rights, b). has accepted the Court's optional jurisdiction, c). the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights has completed its investigation, and d). the case was referred to the 
Court either by the Commission or the state involved in the case within three months of the release of the 
Commission's report. An individual or a petitioner may not independently bring forth a case to be considered by 
the Court.
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facilitate the government’s gold prospecting activities within the Western 
Shoeshone traditional territory.  
They contended that the BLM had wrongly claimed that the Danns’ 
use of the Western Shoeshone homeland had not been ‘undisturbed and 
unchallenged’ until the trespass suit brought by the US.  The Danns had 
specifically challenged this point at the Supreme Court in the 1985 
litigation, but had been prevented from enacting a defence of Western 
Shoeshone “Aboriginal” title against Federal trespass actions, and other 
impediments to their use and enjoyment of ancestral lands, thereby 
depriving them of adequate judicial protection. 
Their pleadings specifically stated that the US had violated the 
following: 
 
Article 1:  
 
To achieve an order of peace and justice, to promote their 
solidarity, to strengthen their collaboration, and to defend their 
sovereignty, their territorial integrity, and their independence.  
 
Article 3 (b): 
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International order consists essentially of respect for the 
personality, sovereignty, and independence of States, and the 
faithful fulfillment of obligations derived from treaties and other 
sources of international law. 
 
Article 14: 
 
Recognition implies that the State granting it accepts the 
personality of the new State, with all the rights and duties that 
international law prescribes for the two States. 
 
Article 18: 
 
Respect for and the faithful observance of treaties constitutes 
standards for the development of peaceful relations among 
States. International treaties and agreements should be public. 
 
Article 26:  
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In the event that a dispute arises between two or more American 
States which, in the opinion of one of them, cannot be settled 
through the usual diplomatic channels, the parties shall agree on 
some other peaceful procedure that will enable them to reach a 
solution. 
 
 In Western Shoeshone v US148 the OAS HR Commission determined 
that the ICC claims process violated the rights under the principles 
established by the US Constitution under the Article 5, Due Process and 
Just Compensation Clause; and by breaching the Article 14 Equal 
Protection Clause. It rejected the US argument that the extinguishment of 
Western Shoeshone title was justified by the need to encourage settlement 
in the western US, because it held that the Treaty was breached in a 
manner that facilitated the taking over of the tribe’s territory, including 
that of the Danns, without recourse to natural justice.  
Moreover, the Commission criticised the premise of the 
extinguishment of title as one not “based on judicial determination of 
pertinent evidence” but on “arbitrary stipulations” between the 
government and the TMC, regarding the time and loss of indigenous title 
                                                
148 Case 11 140, Inter American CHR para. 139, Report no 75/02 (27 December 2002). 
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in the entirety of the Western Shoeshone ancestral lands. It declared the 
transfer of the tribe’s title in 1962 to be against internationally recognised 
human rights procedures in the infringements of the requirement to pay 
just compensation, which it held to be:  
 
… a substantive right and the right to due process that was a 
procedural requirement that was not complied with by the US 
government in the case of the dealings with the Western 
Shoeshone nation.
149
 
 
The Commission held that the Treaty signed by the US with the 
Western Sheoshone was an “attribute of sovereignty” and, if not exercised 
properly, then it also violated the owners’ entitlement to notice, just 
compensation and recourse to judicial review, and by ignoring these 
safeguards in this case, the US government had breached the Dann band’s 
inalienable rights. The OAS HR Commission ruling established a principle 
that a State’s inability to respect the human rights enumerated in its 
Constitution strengthened the case against it in not honouring a similar 
                                                
149  Para 143 Summary and Conclusions of the OAS HR Commission .Indian Law Resource Centre 
http://www.dlncoalition.org/related_issues/dannvsus.htm. 
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right guaranteed under another different Treaty, by which it has promised 
to abide. 
In responding to these preliminary findings the US government 
argued that, rather than invoking breaches of their rights under the US 
Constitution, the Danns should exhaust all their remedies in the US courts.  
The government also alleged that the band had not exhausted domestic 
remedies and could still pursue their claims to tribal land on an individual 
basis rather than as a collective Aboriginal title.   
In confirming its findings in the final report in 2003, however, the 
OAS Commission also referred to the decision of the Ninth Circuit Court 
of Appeals in a case brought by the Dann band alleging violation by the 
US of their land.  In Western Shoeshone National Council v Molini150 the 
Court had summarily decided for the defendant, the State of Nevada 
Wildlife Department and the BLM. The Danns’ group claim on behalf of 
the tribe failed in this case because the judgment stated that there had been 
no interference with the Aboriginal title and the Treaty reserved land to 
hunt and fish. This ruling, which relied upon the 1985 Supreme Court 
dicta of Justice Brennan, regarded it as applicable to all the bands of the 
                                                
150 493 US 890 (1989).  
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Western Shoeshone, and the subsequent denial of their appeal by this 
Court precluded domestic legal redress for the Dann band.  
The OAS findings rebutted the US argument that the Danns’ claims 
were fully and fairly litigated in the US courts and it held that the ICC 
lacked jurisdiction to evaluate processes, such as due process and just 
compensation in settling the claim by the payment of $ 26 million on an 
1872 evaluation. The US claimed that the Supreme Court had ruled that 
the tribe could not litigate the award once its trustee, the Interior 
Department, had accepted receipt of the award in 1974, and that the 1946 
statute establishing the ICC charter predated its 1951 ratification of the 
OAS charter. However, this contention was not accepted and the 
Commission referred to the principles of Article XVII of the proposed 
OAS Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. 
151
  This affirms 
that: 
 
… the Indigenous Peoples are entitled to full recognition of their 
laws, traditions, customs, land tenure systems, and institutions 
for the development and management of resources and the right 
                                                
151 Approved by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights on February 26, 
1997, at its 1333rd session, 95th regular session. 
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to effective measures by states to prevent any intervention with 
alienation of, or encroachment upon those rights.   
 
In rejecting the US argument the Commission held in its Final Merits 
Report that the main issue in the Danns’ case was the 1962 ICC ruling that 
occurred after the US ratification of the OAS charter in 1951 and provided 
the Commission with jurisdiction over the matter, and the capacity to 
adjudicate complaints by the OAS Commission of Human Rights with 
respect to State parties. As such, the OAS Commission considered the 
American Declaration to articulate its member states’ general human rights 
obligations under the OAS charter, and considered it to have the effect of a 
multilateral treaty with the force of law. Thus, it argued that it was a 
binding obligation on the part of the US to uphold the organisation’s 
human rights principles and obligations and to comply with the 
Commission’s recommendations.  
 
Injunctive remedy for breach of environmental laws   
 
The US government acted defiantly to the Commission’s ruling and 
the Bush administration enacted the Land Distribution Act in July 2004, 
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which formally annexed 24 million acres of land in Nevada, Utah, 
California and Idaho that was earmarked as a reserve in the Ruby Valley 
Treaty of 1863. This was officially absorbed with the payment by the US 
government of $145 million awarded to the tribe and most of the 8,000 or 
so eligible tribal members were designated to receive a proportion of the 
payment from this amount.  
152
 
In addition, the Act demarked the Yucca Mountain, a site within the 
Ruby Valley lands, as the nation’s nuclear waste repository by a provision 
in the Act. 
153
 The land is rich in resources, including gold, water and 
geothermal energy. There was a pending mineral exploration right 
awarded to a mining company to operate within the Ruby Valley lands 
through "privatisation" bills brought forward by Senator James Gibbons - 
Republican, and fellow Nevadan Senator Harry Reid - Democrat, both of 
whom are among Congress’ leading recipients of mining company 
monetary contributions.  
The designation of the Yucca Mountain as a national site for 
uranium waste was challenged by the West Shoeshone in an action that 
                                                
152 Western Shoeshone Claims Distribution Act 2004 S 958 (l) transferred 26,000,000 acres from the tribe to the 
US in cash distributions approximately $5 an acre, or $30,000 per tribal member. 
153 The Yucca Mountain is part of 60 million acres of Western Shoeshone territory in Nevada, Idaho, Utah and 
California, which was never ceded to the U.S. government. According to the 1863 Ruby Valley Treaty most of 
the area now used by the U.S. military for nuclear weapons testing and the proposed waste storage site was 
explicitly recognized as Shoeshone land. www.sacredland.org/yucca-mountain/ 
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also brought them into conflict with the Barrack Corporation. This 
Canadian company, which is the world’s largest extractor of gold from the 
mines that lie under the Western Shoeshone land, had been served notice 
by the tribe to eject them from the range. The Mount Tenabo area, where 
the mining corporation was acting, is holy land to the tribe. 
The plaintiffs included the South Fork Band Council of Western 
Shoeshone, the Te-Moak Tribe of Western Shoeshone Indians, the 
Timbisha Shoeshone Tribe, the Western Shoeshone Defense Project, and 
Great Basin Resource Watch. They challenged the US Interior 
Department’s Bureau of Land Management decision to approve the Cortez 
Hills Mine in November of 2008. 
In Western Shoeshone v USA,154 the Federal Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals ruled on the construction and operation of the Cortez Hills gold 
mine that was under-developed by the Barrack Gold Corporation. The 
Court reversed the decision of the US District Court for Nevada, and 
imposed a preliminary injunction on the extraction; and held that the 
Interior Department’s Approval of the mineral range was a violation of the 
National Environmental Policy Act 1982. The Court ruled that the Yucca 
                                                
154 06-16214; April 15, 2008. 
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Mountain mining range was against the public interests due to the 
“irreparable environmental harm threatened by this massive project”.  
The Mount Tenabo area is of cultural importance to the Western 
Shoeshone just as the Black Hills are for the Sioux. It has values of spirit 
life, and medicinal, food and ceremonial plants that underlie their 
practices.  The open-pit mining would include an extensive groundwater 
pumping system to dewater the under soil that would have transported the 
pumped water away from Mount Tenabo. It was contended that the mine 
would permanently destroy approximately 6,800 acres of land on and 
around the landscape, over 90% of which is classified as Federal “public” 
land.  
This ruling has been heralded as a significant development by the 
Western Shoeshone who have been vindicated in their argument that it 
impacts negatively on their land base. The judgment does not address the 
transfer of title, but instead deals with the lack of responsibility of the 
BLM to cater for the needs of the tribe, to which it has a trust duty. It is a 
ruling that has been confirmed in the following case against the 
Department of the Interior. This was a lawsuit whose origins lay in the 
Western Shoeshone claim that plans to industrialise the mountain range 
would cause contamination of their reservation base.  
117 
 
The case involved the Barrack Gold Corporation, and the issue of 
corporate responsibility and the encroachment of indigenous land resulted 
in the injunctive ruling.  
In   South Fork Band and others v US DOI 155 (2009)  the issue arose 
out of the enforcement of the 9
th
 Circuit Court decision that would result in 
the  injunction against the Barrack Corporation because it had held that the 
US Interior Department's BLM had violated Federal law under the Federal 
Land Policy Management Act ("FLPMA") and the National 
Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA") in approving the mining project, and 
by its failure to adequately account for both the Tribes' access to religious 
sites and the mine's environmental impact on the area. 
The respondent, Barrack Cortez Inc, submitted a motion in early 
2010 to the lower court requesting it to only issue a limited injunction, 
which would not halt the entire project but only certain mining activities. 
The South Fork Band, who were parties to the previous action, petitioned 
the lower court to issue a full injunction which would halt all further 
construction activity on the mine until the BLM prepares an updated EIS. 
On April 14 the court refused to require the mine to cease all operations 
                                                
155 April 15, 2008 588 F.3d 718. 
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and instead issued limited restrictions on the company’s activity until the 
full trial takes place.    
The progress of this case, however, has vindicated the campaign of 
the Western Shoeshone bands to pursue the matter in the courts. The 
claims have led to the exposure of mal-administration of the US 
Department of the Interior and, also revealed the lack of respect for the 
indigenous land rights which have been affected by the open-pit mining on 
adjacent land that is still claimed by the tribe as incorrectly annexed by the 
Federal government. 
 
Judicial review of the claim 
 
There is scope, on the basis of the rulings in the international 
tribunals and the recent injunctive rulings, for the Western Shoeshone to 
seek to overturn the judgment of Justice Brennan in Dann at the Supreme 
Court that their title was extinguished by the ICC ruling in 1962.  This can 
be done by dismantling the trust doctrine and its foundation which is the 
root cause of this unequal relationship that has permitted the Federal 
government to annex land and extinguish Western Shoeshone title.  
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It has been criticised as being based on premises that allow 
legislative power against the tribes. In an article by Janice Aitkin the issue 
is discussed in these terms:   
 
 The relationship between the United States and the American 
Indians is marked by extreme shifts in the policy of the federal 
government toward the Indian Nations, from the forcible removal 
of "hundreds of tribes . . . from their ancestral lands" to "a 
commitment . . . to revive tribal governments."  The history of 
that relationship developed out of a tension between the two 
doctrines that form the basis for the federal-tribal relationship: 
the "plenary" power over Indian affairs vested in the federal 
government by the United States Constitution and "special trust 
obligations" which impose strict fiduciary standards on the 
federal government's dealings with Indians. The "trust doctrine" 
is rooted in Chief Justice Marshall's opinions in the "Cherokee 
Cases," Cherokee Nation v. Georgia and Worcester v. Georgia, 
where he described the relation of the Indian tribes to the United 
States as resembling "that of a ward to his guardian. 
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 This doctrine has proved to be a two-edged sword. For more 
than five decades following the Cherokee Cases, issues regarding 
the scope and meaning of the trust doctrine remained dormant. 
Then, for a period of about forty years, beginning with United 
States v. Kagama and ending with United States v. Candelaria, 
the trust doctrine was treated as an additional, independent 
source of federal power over Indian affairs. During this period, 
the trust relationship was used to expand the ability of the 
Federal Government to intrude into internal...
156
. 
 
 In the Dann case at the Supreme Court the plaintiff had argued that 
the Treaty of RV did not dispense with the lands of the tribe and that the 
tribe was a sovereign nation.  At the 9
th
 Circuit Court of Appeals the loss 
of title had not been expressly ruled on, and the Supreme Court recognised 
this, making it possible premises for future consideration. The judicial 
review will seek to overturn the notion of terra nullius, the basis upon 
which the US has exercised authority that denies title to Aboriginal people 
who have not agreed to dispose of their land. 
                                                
156
 The Trust Doctrine in Federal Indian Law: A Look at its Development and at How Its Analysis Under Social 
Contract Theory Might Expand Its Scope. Winder 1997. 18 N. Illinois University Law Rev. 115 
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There is plausible evidence upon which the notion that the US is the 
guardian and the Indians are its wards is dispensed with absolutely. The 
grounds on which to argue are the documents which form a chronology 
and came at the formative time of the US. It was manifested in a late 
nineteenth century NW Ordinance, promulgated by the Congress in 14 
July 1787, which stated the following:  
 
The utmost good faith that shall always be observed towards the 
Indians, their lands and their liberty that it shall never be taken 
from them without their consent; and in their property, rights and 
liberty, they shall never be invaded or disturbed, unless in just 
and lawful wars authorized by Congress...
157
  
 
 The subsequent Act of Congress in 1861 to organise the Territory of 
Nevada invoked the principles of territorial integrity and free consent 
stated in the Ordinance. These explicitly applied them to the Western 
Shoeshone and other Indian nations pre-existing on the territory. Its 
preamble was set out in these terms:  
 
                                                
157 The Northwest Ordinance, 1 Stat. 51. 
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Nothing in this act ... shall be construed to impair the rights of 
persons or property pertaining to the Indians in said territory, so 
long as such rights shall remain unextinguished by treaty with the 
United States and such Indians, ... but all such territory 
(belonging to the Indians) shall be excepted out of the 
boundaries, and constitute no part of the territory of Nevada, 
until said tribe shall signify their assent to the president of the 
United States, to be included in said territory…158 
 
 By taking the Treaty of Ruby Valley 1863 into consideration against 
the background of these two documents, the US has not extinguished 
Western Shoeshone land rights that gave a formal expression to the 
fundamental principles of territorial integrity and free consent on the basis 
of international relations. The Supreme Court had accepted in its 1985 
judgment that the substance of the rights had never been litigated; that left 
intact the Ninth Circuit ruling holding on to the substantive issues of 
Western Shoeshone land rights.  
The 1985 Supreme Court’s reversal of the Ninth Circuit decision on 
an interpretation of the Indian Claims Commission ruling was on the 
                                                
158 Act to Organize the Territory of Nevada, Id. (1861). 
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assertion that the US may act as a "trustee" for the Western Shoeshone 
Nation. However, the tribe’s argument is that there is no trustee 
relationship between the tribe and the US government, and while the Court 
in its judgment did presume the existence of a bona-fide, documented trust 
relationship, none of these prove the existence of a "trust" in the 
circumstances of the Indian tribes and the US. 
The trust relationship is itself a highly contentious matter between 
the tribes and the US government. As the Hopi case revealed, it is a special 
relationship granting a right of guardianship while admitting to a free 
consent of the Indians. However, in fixing the award, the ICC placed the 
US in a dual and contradictory role by making the Federal Government at 
once a judgment debtor and a trustee for the Tribe. This had the effect of 
ordering the Government qua judgment debtor to pay and the Government 
qua trustee for the Tribe as the beneficiary.  
In acknowledging that individual Western Shoeshone land rights 
may exist, but on the basis that a "payment" had been effected, the 
Supreme Court ruling in effect stated that, although the tribe received no 
money and opposed the conversion of their land, they were still bound to 
obey the ruling of the Claims Court. 
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This interpretation of the trust instrument has been criticised by 
Milner S. Ball who states: 
159
 
 
The trust doctrine was the device the Court applied   for 
executing this maneuver, that made the US not only the judgment 
debtor to Indians, but was also trustee to the Indians. Therefore 
the United States as debtor can pay itself as trustee, say this 
change in bookkeeping constitutes payment to Indians, and the 
Court will certify the fiction as a reality.  
 
The trust is a construct of the ward/guardianship theory that invokes the 
Marshall doctrine which is based upon the outmoded concepts of Christian 
supremacy. Its genesis is the "discovery," and "trusteeship" over 
"heathens" that, at its annunciation, relied upon the charters of monarchs 
and popes in centuries past to fashion a reasoning that the land the 
Europeans settled upon was terra nullius. This has been relied upon in 
Supreme Court opinions up to the present day. 
The Western Shoeshone in the class action of the Dann band have 
expressly rejected these concepts of religious supremacy inherent in the 
                                                
159 Constitution, Court, Indian Tribes," 1987 American Bar Foundation Research Journal 1, 65 (1987).  
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doctrine as an unacceptable legal basis for international relations,  or as 
justification for assertion of authority of the Federal government over the 
tribes. The doctrine of Christian supremacy and the concomitant assertion 
of federal "trusteeship" over "Indian wards"  is inherent in the notion of a  
"Christian discovery"  that may not operate by collateral estoppel or res 
judicata or otherwise - to bar a full and fair adjudication of the facts of the 
plaintiffs' rights to, and in, their homelands. 
On January 17, 2006, however, the US Federal Court of Claims 
dismissed a petition in Western Shoeshone v US,160 which sought to 
invalidate the judgment of ICC in 1977 that awarded compensation in lieu 
of return of the lands and to seek additional compensation for the breach of 
the 1863 Treaty. The Court granted the US motion to dismiss the 
plaintiff’s action for lack of subject-matter and for failure to state a claim. 
The claim had to be made within five years under the limitation period set 
out in Section 12 of the ICCA. This was submitted 24 years later.  
 
 
 
 
                                                
160 73 Fed. Cl. 59 (2006). 
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Possible remedies in the international forums   
  
The treatment of Western Shoeshone by the US as their trustee has 
not met the international standard as a fiduciary as was decided by the 
OAS HR Commission rulings. There has further support for this theory by 
the finding on March 10, 2006 of the UN Committee on the Elimination of 
Racial Discrimination. Their resolution stated that there was "credible 
information alleging that the Western Shoeshone indigenous people are 
being denied their traditional rights to land". 
161
 Its monitoring of the US 
behaviour has been continuous and provides an international spotlight on 
the conduct of the Federal government.  
The standards that the US needs to apply have been enhanced in the 
backdrop of the Declaration of Rights of the Indigenous Peoples at the 
UN. The General Assembly resolution of September 2008 does not carry a 
                                                
161 The UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) urged the US to “freeze”, “desist” 
and “stop” actions being taken or threatened to be taken against the Western Shoeshone. In its decision, CERD 
stressed the “nature and urgency” of the Shoeshone situation informing the U.S. that it goes “well beyond” the 
normal reporting process and warrants immediate attention under the Committee’s Early Warning and Urgent 
Action Procedure. www.indigenousinstituteamericas.org/UN blastsUStreatment ofSheoshones.html.  
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Convention status and is, therefore, not legally binding but does have 
moral authority.
162
 The preamble expresses concern 
 
… that indigenous peoples have suffered from historic injustices 
as a result of  their colonization and dispossession of their lands, 
territories and resources, thus preventing them from exercising, 
in particular, their right to development in accordance with their 
own needs and interests. 
 
Article 27 states:  
 
States shall establish and implement, in conjunction with 
indigenous peoples concerned, a fair, independent, impartial, 
open and transparent process, giving due recognition to 
indigenous peoples’ laws, traditions, customs and land tenure 
systems, to recognize and adjudicate the rights of indigenous 
peoples pertaining to their lands, territories and resources, 
including those which were traditionally owned or otherwise 
                                                
162
 The General Assembly overwhelmingly backed protections for the human rights of 
indigenous peoples, adopting a landmark declaration that brought to an end nearly 25 years of 
contentious negotiations over the rights of native people to protect their lands and resources, 
and to maintain their unique cultures and traditions. www.un.org/news./press.docs/2007/ga10612.doc.html. 

128 
 
occupied or used. Indigenous peoples shall have the right to 
participate in this process. 
 
Article 38 lays a duty upon the host countries to take effective measures  
 
 to achieve the ends of the Declaration.  
 
This Declaration calls for the implementation of a different ideological 
impulse than the one pursued by the US under the Marshall doctrine. 
However, it has not been accepted by the Federal government which, 
along with Canada, is at present the only country that has opposed the 
declaration at the General assembly.
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The Western Shoeshone claim that the religious aspect of the 
concept of discovery is a bar to the recognition of their rights has been 
upheld recently by a recent acknowledgement of the Episcopalian Church 
which issued a condemnation in a resolution entitled “Repudiate the 
Doctrine of Discovery”.
164
 It renounced the doctrine “as fundamentally 
opposed to the Gospel of Jesus Christ and our understanding of the 
                                                
163
 The resolution was passed by 147-4 with the opposition by US, Canada, Australian and New Zealand. 

164 It was passed unanimously by the Episcopal House of Bishops during the church’s 76th General Convention 
July 8 – 17 2009 in Anaheim. 
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inherent rights that individuals and peoples have received from God,” and 
promises to share the document with its churches, governments within its 
boundaries, and the UN. 
The resolution expressly asks Queen Elizabeth II to publicly 
repudiate the Doctrine of Discovery, by revoking the Charters to John 
Cabot and encourages all Episcopal churches to support indigenous 
peoples in their ongoing efforts for their inherent sovereignty and 
fundamental human rights as peoples to be respected. 165The Native 
American jurist, Steven Newcomb, has claimed it to be a success in the 
following terms: 
166
 
 
… (t)he significance of the resolution in relation to the efforts by 
indigenous nations to protect their sacred places. The Black Hills, 
Mt. Graham, the Go-Road in Northern California, Yucca 
Mountain and San Francisco Peaks are the most well known, but 
there are certainly many others throughout the continent. 
 
Since they first arrived, Christian Europeans worked hard to cut 
                                                
165 John Cabot was a citizen of Venice but he obtained letters-patent from Henry VII of England in 1496 to 
conduct a voyage of ‘discovery’ on behalf of the British Crown. 
166 “The Right of Christian Invasion”, Indian Country Today, 31/7/09. 
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the ties of indigenous nations to their traditional lands. Attacking 
their languages and ceremonial traditions in the name of 
Christianity was a key means of attempting to sever the ongoing 
spiritual relationship that indigenous nations maintained for 
many thousands of years with their most sacred places and 
territories. 
 
The Episcopal Church has been complimented by the Quakers’ 
proclamation at their “Indian Committee of Philadelphia Yearly Meeting” 
in 2009 in its Minutes – analogous to a resolution of its meeting.
167
  The 
Minutes read as follows:  
 
The Doctrine of Discovery was a principle of international law 
developed in a series of 15th century papal bulls and 16th century 
charters by European monarchs. It was a racist philosophy that 
gave white Christian Europeans the green light to go forth and 
claim the lands and resources of non-Christian peoples and kill or 
enslave them, if other Christian Europeans had not already done 
so.  
                                                
167 Indian Country Today 13/12/09. ‘Quakers renounce discovery doctrine’.  
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 If there is no remedy in the US courts to resolve this issue of land 
title, then on the basis of the findings of the OAS, CERD and the 
provisions of the Declaration of Indigenous Rights at the UN, the Western 
Shoeshone may seek to assert their right to self-determination. The 
precedence in which indigenous rights and territorial integrity have 
merged to establish a principle of free consent in international law is the 
judgment in Western Sahara Case.168 The dispute centred on Spain’s 
remaining territory in Africa which Algeria and the Polisario, an 
indigenous group, were claiming as sovereign territory that had a right to 
independence, and Morocco was claiming as part of its nation state.    
It came before the ICJ in 1974 when Morocco announced its 
intention to bring the issue to the ICJ.  As a consequence Spain agreed to 
delay the referendum on the future of the territory pending the ICJ 
submission on the grounds that it be a non-binding, advisory opinion, 
rather than a "contentious issue", where the ruling would oblige the 
interested states to act in a particular manner. The UN General Assembly 
                                                
168 ICJ REP. 12, 36, par. 70. (1975). 
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issued Resolution 3292, which affirmed the wording of the reference to be 
submitted.   
 It was based on the following questions: 
 
I. Was Western Sahara (Río de Oro and Sakiet El Hamra) at the time of 
colonisation by Spain a territory belonging to no one, i.e., was terra 
nullius?  
 
If the majority opinion was "no", could the following be addressed: 
 
II. What were the legal ties between this territory and the Kingdom of 
Morocco and the Mauritanian entity?  
 
The evidence was submitted by Spain, Algeria, Mauritania and Morocco 
that, according to rules as internationally-recognised, States have a right of 
representation ruling out the Polisario from making submissions. In its 
pleadings Spain cited the relationship which explorers and colonisers had 
with the Sultan, none of which ever recognised his authority over the 
region. In their submission, Algeria defended its claim that the Saharans 
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were a distinct people, and not bound to be part of either Morocco or 
Mauritania. 
The ICJ decided by a vote of 13 to 3 that at the time of colonisation 
the territory was not terra nullius. It acknowledged that there were legal 
ties of allegiance between this territory and Morocco, based on tribal links 
that had made the border porous. However, the Court defined the nature of 
these legal ties in the penultimate paragraph of its opinion, and declared 
that neither legal tie implied sovereignty or rightful ownership by the 
Kingdom over the territory. These legal ties also did not apply because of 
the right to "self-determination through the free and genuine expression of 
the will of the peoples of the Territory."  
169
   
The WS-NC  have the basis to argue that international law prohibits 
organs of the US government from interfering with Western Shoeshone 
self-determination; and the attempt by the US to enforce a "taking" of 
Western Shoeshone land was described by purported "representative 
members" of the Ta-Moak Council as a flagrant and unacceptable invasion 
of Western Shoeshone territory and sovereignty. 
                                                
169 ICJ Reports (1975) p.68, para. 162). 
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Further, they may argue the Indian Claims Court process for 
"representation" of the Western Shoeshones Nation by "any member" of 
the tribe constitutes a denial of due process and equal protection to all 
members of the Western Shoeshones not actually represented by the 
officially-designated "representative". Indigenous claims in the ICC are 
unlike a class action suit in that there is a necessity that the position of 
each individual member of the group be represented, and therefore any 
decision it reaches is null and void concerning individual bands of the 
tribe.  
The theory that payment may be "deemed" to have been made to the 
TMC, thus, does not effect a transfer of the Western Shoeshone land rights 
to the US. The NC was not a party before the ICC, and nor was a majority 
of Western Shoeshone persons ever actually represented by any party to 
the ICC proceedings. These are plausible grounds to support the 
contention that the trustee qua trustee relationship was never reached, and 
so forth.  
The issues that the indigenous people face in other countries, where 
there is a large population of indigenous people, resonates with those of 
the Indians in the US, with whom they bear a historical comparison.  There 
have, however, already been initiatives in the direction of granting them 
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rights in land that overrides the concept of them being tenants of will of 
the estates they reside upon.  The legal systems of Canada and Australia 
have reached further than the US to facilitate the native peoples’ rights in 
land and there needs to be an evaluation of their developing jurisprudence.   
 
Canada  
 
The Canadian Constitution Act 1982 sets out the relationship 
between the Indians, Metis and Inuit in a legal framework. The origins of 
this relationship have been defined as going back to the Royal 
Proclamation Act of 1763, which came after the French and Indian war. It 
set out a territory and the terms of the relationship were to maintain the 
Indians as wards of the Crown until the dominion of Canada came into 
being.  
170
  
There has been an extension of legal responsibility granted to the 
first nations for leasing reserve lands to other parties and retaining rights in 
land.  In R v Guerin 171  the Musquem Indian band held roughly 416 acres 
                                                
170 The RP Act came into effect after the French and Indian War when the Treaty of Paris ended the close 
relationship of the Indians of the Great Lakes Region with France. It created a boundary line between the British 
colonies on the Atlantic coast and Indian Reserve west of the Appalachian Mountains. The proclamation also 
gave the Crown a monopoly on all future land purchases from American Indians until dominion of Canada was 
created in 1867.   
171 2 SCR 335 (1984). 
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(1.7 km²) of prime land in the Vancouver area, and in 1958, the Federal 
government, on behalf of the band, made a deal with the Shaughnessy 
Heights Golf Club to lease 162 acres (0.7 km²) of the land in order to build 
a golf club. However, the actual terms of the agreement between the 
government and the club were not revealed to the band.  
In 1970, the band discovered the true terms and protested on the 
basis that the government had a duty to properly explain the full extent of 
the deal. The terms were less favourable than if there had been a formal 
surrender of the lease. At first instance the court held that the Crown had 
breached their trust with the band and awarded the Musqueam ten million 
dollars. This ruling was overturned by the Federal Court of Appeal. The 
matter was then considered by the Supreme Court of Canada, which 
reasoned that the nature of Aboriginal title imposes an enforceable 
fiduciary duty upon the Crown. The Court ruled that the government had 
breached its fiduciary duty by making the lease on different terms from 
what had been promised to the tribe. 
The Court stated that the fiduciary duties of the Crown derived from 
the nature of title and from the Indian Acts, and held Canada liable for its 
breach of duty in that case. It established the Aboriginal title to be a sui 
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generis right and rejected the government’s limitation period defence to 
claim by ruling that the government had been guilty of “fraudulent 
concealment” and “equitable fraud” by not providing a copy of the lease to 
the band. Therefore, the limitation period did not begin to run until they 
had obtained knowledge of the government’s breach in 1970.  
Justice Dickson described the nature of Aboriginal title as an 
inherent right that existed prior to the Royal Proclamation of 1793 and one 
which was founded on historical occupation. Justices Beetz, Chouinard 
and Lamer JJ concurred with his opinion which stated:  
 
[w]here by statute, agreement, or perhaps by unilateral 
undertaking, one party has an obligation to act for the benefit of 
another, and that obligation carries with it a discretionary power, 
the party thus empowered becomes a fiduciary. Equity will then 
supervise the relationship by holding him to the fiduciary's strict 
standard of conduct.
172
  
 
 The second major point that came out of the case is the Court’s 
ruling is that the government owes a unique, legally enforceable fiduciary 
                                                
172 166 CLR 186 (1988). 
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duty to first nations when dealing with reserve lands. This duty places the 
government under a legal duty to take the same care with the management 
of tribal lands as would be exercised by a prudent person when dealing 
with his own property.  
Subsequently, many first nations have been able to make successful 
claims against the government for breaches of fiduciary duty. This part of 
the decision was especially encouraging to those tribes who under Section 
35 of the Constitution Act (“CA”) have been able to rely upon the 
recognised and affirmed Aboriginal and Treaty rights.  
In R v Sparrow173 the Supreme Court interpreted the Section to hold 
that Aboriginal rights, such as fishing, that were in existence in 1982 are 
protected and could not be infringed without justification on account of the 
government's fiduciary duty to the Aboriginal peoples of Canada. The 
fiduciary relationship would extend to existing fishing rights even if there 
was no inherent right to fish based on the Musqueam tribe’s fishing rights 
that had not been continuously exercised over centuries.   
The Court, however, interpreted the provisions in the Constitution 
Act 1982 to mean that communal native title ensures for the benefit of the 
                                                
173 1 S.C.R. 1075 (1990). 
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community as a whole, and this includes the sub-groups and individuals 
within it who have particular rights, and the tribe consists as a sum of the 
whole.  The Court held that the word "existing" in Section 35(1) must be 
"interpreted flexibly so as to permit their evolution over time". As such, 
"existing" was interpreted as referring to rights that were not 
"extinguished" prior to the introduction of the 1982 Constitution. This 
termination could only occur through an act that showed "clear and plain 
intention" on the part of the government to deny those rights and this was 
not provable prior to 1982.
174
 
 
Australia  
 
The arrival date of the Europeans in Australia was 1788 when the 
Aboriginal people and the Torres Islanders were displaced.  The mid-
nineteenth century saw the expansion of the population with the discovery 
of gold in east Australia, which caused the white population to more than 
double between 1850 and 1860. It then took more than a century for the 
                                                
174  The Court used Professor Slattery's definition in “Understanding Aboriginal Rights," supra, at p. 782, (1987, 
Canada Bar Association) that interprets “existing" as those rights are "affirmed in a contemporary form rather than in 
their primeval simplicity and vigour".  This interprets the constitutional guarantee embodied in s. 35(1) and the 
notion of "frozen rights" was to be rejected. 
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Aboriginal Land Rights Act 1976 to come into force as a result of the 
findings of the Woodward Aboriginal Land Rights Commission, and a 
framework was established to consider land claims, based upon the four 
Land Councils set up under the Act. It enabled Aboriginal people in the 
North Territory to claim rights to land based on traditional occupation.     
The issue that came before the courts was whether a fiduciary 
relationship allowed the making of land grants on trust for Aboriginal 
peoples.  In Mabo v Queensland 175  there was determination of the legal 
rights of the Meriam people to land on the Murray Island, which was 
annexed to the State of Queensland in 1879. This was because prior to 
their contact with Europeans the Meriam people had lived on the islands in 
a subsistence economy based on farming. The Island was not subject to 
public or community ownership, but was regarded as belonging to 
individuals or groups. 
The Queensland Government, however, attempted to terminate the 
proceedings by enacting the Coast Islands Declaratory Act 1985, which 
stipulated that, upon the annexation of the Islands in 1879, their vesting in 
the State of Queensland was "freed from all other rights, interests and 
claims whatsoever". In the High Court it was held that this legislation was 
                                                
175 166 CLR 186 (1988). 
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contrary to the Racial Discrimination Act 1975, and the plaintiffs further 
sought declarations that the Meriam people were entitled to the Murray 
Islands "as owners, as possessors, as occupiers or as persons entitled to use 
and enjoy the said islands".  Their arguments were that they held a 
possessory title by reason of long possession, which was accepted by the 
Court.   
The Queensland Government argued that, when the territory of a 
settled colony became part of the Crown's dominions, and the law of 
England became the law of the colony, it meant that the Crown acquired 
the "absolute beneficial ownership", but this reasoning was rejected.  In   
Mabo v Queensland (2)176 the implications of the constitutional treatment 
of the Aboriginal peoples was considered in the light of the trust that was 
declared to arise in their favour in the first judgment.  The Torres Strait 
Islands were confirmed as belonging to the indigenous people based upon 
the findings of fact made by Justice Moynihan in this case. He held that 
the Murray Islanders had a strong sense of relationship to the islands and 
regarded the land as theirs to own in perpetuity.  
 He ruled as follows:   
 
                                                
176 175, CLR 1 (1992). 
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A common law doctrine founded on unjust discrimination in the 
enjoyment of civil and political rights demands reconsideration. 
It is contrary both to international standards and to the 
fundamental values of our common law to entrench a 
discriminatory rule which, because of the supposed position on 
the scale of social organization of the indigenous inhabitants of a 
settled colony, denies them a right to occupy their traditional 
lands. 
 
The decision implied that the indigenous population had a pre-existing 
claim in law, which remains in force except where specifically modified or 
extinguished by legislative or executive action. The Court also repudiated 
the concept that, on the acquisition of sovereignty, absolute beneficial 
ownership of all the lands inhabited by native Australians vested in the 
Crown. The majority thought that, upon acquisition of sovereignty, the 
Crown acquired not an absolute but a qualified title that would be subject 
to native title rights where those rights had not been validly extinguished. 
The Court accepted that the common law land rights could co-exist with 
the law of native tribes which was a product of customary laws and 
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traditions though, where there had been a valid grant of fee simple by the 
Crown, the Aboriginal title would be extinguished.  
In response to the Mabo (2) judgment, the Australian Federal 
Parliament enacted the Native Title Act 1993. This established a statutory 
definition of native title based on the comment made by Justice Brennan in 
the Canadian case of Sparrow that "native title has its origin and is given 
its content by the traditional laws acknowledged by and the customs 
observed by the indigenous inhabitants of a territory". 177 The Commission 
established they could ascertain and define the legal position of 
landholders, and the processes that must be followed for native title to be 
claimed, protected and recognised through the courts.   
However, the notion of claiming land rights is independent of 
asserting native title and, as the Aboriginal Land Rights Act 1976 points in 
its preamble, it was designed for the establishment of “new legal rights  
created and granted under Australian law” to indigenous Australians.
178
 In 
a land rights claim, indigenous people can seek a grant of title to land from 
the Commonwealth, State or Territory governments. That grant may 
                                                
177 Judge Brennan in Mabo at pages 64 and 69. 
178 Section 23.
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protect those interests by giving indigenous people legal ownership of that 
land. 
This is the basis of a new land law theory that takes a critical view of 
all that has happened as a consequence of the Marshall doctrine. It will 
lead to the establishment of new legal rights created and granted by 
statutory law in the US. This can be of the same range and category as the 
Australian law, but with greater implications because of the large 
territorial base of Indian reservations. The scope of those rights is sui 
generis for the purpose of extending to the customs and the land of the 
native people.  
 
Conclusion  
 
 In the US the Native Americans exist in a legal limbo because of the 
anachronistic laws that govern them.  They are part of a framework that 
needs radical appraisal and reform. In that conundrum of nineteenth 
century treaties that have been signed under bribery or coercion, they are 
seeking to overturn the mechanisms that have ruled them. 
179
The Treaty of 
R V is incorporated into the "Supreme Law of the Land" by Article VI of 
                                                
179 The US signed treaties with the Native Americans from 1787 up until 1868. 
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the US Constitution which gives precedence to treaties signed with foreign 
nations. These have become the basis for "rights safeguarded by the 
Constitution”. 
180
  
Under its plenary power, however, Congress decides the conduct of 
the relations with the Indian tribes. In the manner of its execution of the 
Treaty with the Western Shoeshone the premise is that of recognising the 
sovereign rights of the tribe in their dealings with the US. This has not 
been implemented from the time of the taking of the land, i.e., since the 
Treaty was signed. There is breach of the 5
th
 Amendment that allows the 
taking of land under strict guidelines of public benefit, justice and its true 
monetary value. The US government has not acted in accordance with 
these concepts and, while it has paid compensation in the 1962 rulings of 
the ILT, that is not a genuine decision because the majority of the tribe has 
refused to accept it as a reflection of the real economic worth. In any event 
they want the land seized after the Treaty to be returned and for the Treaty 
to be negotiated in its proper spirit.  
The issue that has been of concern to the Indians is the title to land 
as that has the greatest impact legally. This refers to the land that has been 
surrendered after the Treaty was signed. It is not in the West Shoeshone 
                                                
180 Article VI, Clause 2 of the US Constitution states that all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the 
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land.  
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Reservation and there can be no Supreme Court ruling of 1985 res 
judicata. The matter has been raised in the landmark ruling in the OAS HR 
Commission that upheld a breach by the US of its Bill of Rights and the 
infringement of the American Declaration of Rights.  
This ruling provides the Western Shoeshone strong grounds to plead 
their case in a judicial review of their title claim as that was abolished by 
means that did not meet natural justice standards. The recent 9
th
 court 
ruling has confirmed that the US Government has, in licencing the Barrack 
Corporation to mine land in the Mount Tenabo area, infringed an 
elemental right of the tribe in practicing their religion in a traditional 
manner. The Declaration of the Rights of the Indigenous Peoples 2007 is 
also strongly in their favour in order to petition for the connection that they 
have with their lands.  
In its 1985 judgment the Supreme Court did not expressly overrule 
the question of title deeds that would be a key to any subsequent legal 
action that could invoke the restoration of ancestral lands.  The plenary 
power of Congress prevents the Western Shoeshone from being a 
sovereign nation in real terms and the Marshall doctrine has emaciated 
their status as a domestic dependent nation. This precludes the challenge in 
the ICJ which could only be initiated by a UN resolution in the General 
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Assembly by another country that could compel the World Court at The 
Hague to act on the precedence of the Western Sahara case. The lack of a 
mechanism under the Declaration of Rights of the Indigenous People 
means that the matter cannot be raised as an infringement in the UN as it 
would if there was a breach of the Convention of Civil and Political 
Rights. 
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The Western Shoeshone need to solve the issue of  locus standi, and 
invalidate the ruling of the defunct ICC,  that may lead to the ending of the 
trustee status of the US,  that allow the terms of their beneficial status to be 
subjectively viewed in the context of guardianship. The notion of terra 
nullius lies buried in the sand where the courts in countries outside the US 
with large Aboriginal populations have declared that the native people did 
have a pre-existing right before the Europeans invaded their lands.  It is 
time to bring to an end the tribes’ dependence on the US, which has 
deprived the indigenous peoples of their true inheritance and sold out their 
rights for the enrichment of the gold diggers.  
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 Articles 1 and 3 are pertinent in this case. Art 1 states: (i) All peoples have the right of self-determination. By 
virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and 
cultural development. Art 3:  States Parties to the present Covenant, including those having responsibility for the 
administration of Non-Self-Governing and Trust Territories, shall promote the realisation of the right of self-
determination, and shall respect that right, in conformity with the provisions of the Charter of the United 
Nations.  
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